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1 Introduction
The 2007–2009 global crisis started in the financial sector and quickly turned into a global recession
with an unprecedented decline in output, employment, and trade. The lessons from previous
emerging market crises indicate that banks’ and firms’ financing conditions are key mechanisms
turning financial crises into recessions. Higher cost of external financing and declining collateral
values force firms to lower leverage by lowering investment leading to lower output (Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997)). Changes in leverage over the business cycle is, therefore, a potentially important
amplification mechanism propagating the initial adverse shock to the real economy (Bernanke and
Gertler (1995)). Many commentators have argued that the lending boom of the early 2000s, which
fueled the sub-prime crises, caused firms and banks to increase their leverage to unprecedented
levels. When the boom turned into a bust, following the banks’ contraction of credit, a sharp
de-leveraging accompanied the largest global financial meltdown since the Great Depression.
To this date, no empirical evidence has been brought to bear on the determinants of leverage
before and after the crisis in the framework of an international comparative study, although many
recent theory papers aim at understanding the endogenous leverage process (Farhi and Tirole
(2010); Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008); Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)).1 This is the task
we undertake in this paper by studying leverage patterns across firms, banks, and countries over
time before and after the 2007–2009 crisis. Our main result is that excessive risk taking before
the crisis was not easily detectable in aggregate data because pre-crisis increases in leverage was
mainly limited to investment banks and brokers/dealers in developed countries. Large banks also
took large risks although this mainly became clear after the crises started. These institutions grew
their balance sheets aggressively by increasing debt and assets during asset booms—this pattern
was prevalent in the United States and to a lesser extent in Europe. Banks in emerging markets
behaved differently possibly due to tighter bank regulation and stronger investor protection. Using
regression analysis, we show that banks in emerging markets had a tendency to grow leverage ratios
less aggressively before the crisis and (with high statistical significance) were able to maintain their
leverage ratios during the crisis.
The current global crisis underscores the importance of understanding patterns in leverage over
time, across firms and banks, and whether these patterns differ across countries with different
institutional and regulatory structures. In particular, we would like to know what type of banks
1Important early exceptions are the highly influential works of Adrian and Shin (2008, 2009, 2010) and Greenlaw,
Hatzius, Kashyap, and Shin (2008). These papers focus solely on the United States.
1
and firms were highly leveraged in which countries in the run-up to crisis. We study these patterns
by utilizing the most comprehensive and comparable firm-level and bank-level world-wide dataset,
ORBIS from Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvD), 2000–2009. Our data set covers listed,
private, large, and small non-financial firms, financial firms as well as banks. There appears to
be no previous work that investigates the determinants of firm and bank capital structure using
time-varying, comprehensive, and comparable data from many countries. Hence, the novelty of our
study comes from the fact that we are the first to investigate patterns of firm leverage together
with patterns of bank-financing using a global micro-level data set over time.
Why is this important? Establishing leverage patterns across time and across countries using
country level aggregate data may not give the full picture. Even for a single country there may
be issues since aggregate data masks micro level patterns. For example, Adrian and Shin (2008,
2009, 2010) show that leverage patterns are countercyclical for the U.S. non-financial sector, as
expected, but this is not the case when they focus on particular institutions within the financial
sector, namely broker dealers. A rise in asset prices will mechanically increase the value of equity
(banks’ net worth) as a percentage of assets. Therefore, rising asset prices will lead to a lower
leverage ratio, defined as the ratio of assets to equity. Conversely, in a downturn, asset prices
would fall and the leverage ratio would increase. Adrian and Shin (2008, 2009, 2010) finds that
such a pattern holds for the non-financial sector but not for investment banks, whose leverage
rises during booms and falls during downturns; i.e., the leverage of investment banks is procyclical.
This procyclicality amplifies the business cycle, potentially leading to systemic risk if asset prices
do not properly reflect fundamental values (“bubbles”). Their findings show that these financial
institutions actively manage their balance sheet and leverage during the booms and busts using
collateralized borrowing and lending. He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) emphasize the shift in
securitized assets within the financial sector by showing that while investment banks were decreasing
their leverage by selling such assets during the deleveraging process of 2008–2009, commercial banks
and government increased their leverage since these latter institutions acquired these assets.
The works by Adrian and Shin and He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy use mainly aggregate-
sectoral data from the Flow of Funds of the Federal Reserve and can only investigate the difference
between commercial banks and investment banks as an aggregate in the U.S. but not systematically
bank-by-bank and not as banks from different countries.2 It is very likely that these type of
2Adrian and Shin (2008, 2009, 2010) use data from SEC filings for five big investment banks in the U.S.: Lehman
Brothers, Merill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Bear Sterns, Goldman Sachs, and Citigroup, finding results similar to ours.
He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) and Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap, and Shin (2008) also use data from the
2
aggregate patterns are driven by the big banks. We think it is important to know how typical
investment banks and typical commercial banks behave and whether the U.S. patterns are different
from those of other countries. From a regulatory standpoint, the policy prescription will differ
if aggregate patterns are driven by few big players rather than by a large number of small and
mid-size banks.
We show that leverage is procylical for large commercial banks in the United States and to a
lesser extent in Europe, where we define a “large” bank as a bank that has more then a billion
dollars worth of assets at the beginning of our sample. These banks seem to have increased their
leverage pre-crisis because they have comparative advantage in raising funds in short-term market
(overnight repos and commercial paper) and they skirted capital requirements using off-balance
sheet investment vehicles. They may be somewhat more stable than investment banks due to
their ability to also obtain funds from deposits; nonetheless, excessive risk taking from huge banks,
which are considered safe due to explicit deposit insurance and implicit insurance (“too-big-to-fail”),
raises serious regulatory issues. Our paper’s main contribution is to help us understand patterns
of leverage before the crisis. Our results may have important policy implications especially with
regards to regulatory reform.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical
literature on leverage. Section 3 lays out a simple theoretical framework for ease of interpreting
the empirical results. Section 4 presents our data and discusses relevant issues. Section 5 presents
the empirical patterns and regression results. Section 6 presents robustness analysis. Section 7
concludes.
2 Literature on Leverage
Since the celebrated paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958) there has been an outpouring of theo-
retical work on the underpinnings of the firm’s capital structure but empirical work is only slowly
catching up. Theoretical models pinpoint important departures from the Modigliani-Miller assump-
tion which makes capital structure relevant for the value of firms. However, we still do not know
the empirical relevance of many different theories. Specifically, we lack a good understanding of
the determinants of capital structure of the private and public sector especially outside the United
States because most of the empirical literature focuses on the United States using data from COM-
SEC on five big commercial banks in the United States: Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Citibank, Wachovia,
and Wells Fargo and find similar results.
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PUSTAT on large listed firms. This literature is mostly cross-sectional and hence cannot speak to
the time-series dynamics in leverage patterns (see Frank and Goyal (2004) for an example).
The corporate finance literature studying U.S. non-financial listed firms shows that the most
important cross-firm determinants of leverage are size, profitability, and tangibility (collateral). In
a seminal paper, Rajan and Zingales (1995), using data from non-financial listed firms for the year
1991, find that these factors are also important for leverage in the G7 countries and differences in
accounting practices across countries do not affect the leverage patterns for firms. They also find
that European firms have higher levels of leverage on average than U.S. firms. Booth et al. (2001)
study ten developing countries using a data set of large listed firms in a static setting and find that
the factors important for leverage in developed countries (size, profitability, and tangibility) are also
important for developing countries; however, at the same time there are significant country-level
differences in mean levels of leverage. Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2006) undertake a dynamic
analysis using data (COMPUSTAT and CRSP) from listed U.S. firms and conclude that more
than 90 percent of the variation in leverage is captured by firm-fixed effects and the determinants
identified by the previous cross-sectional literature—such as size, profitability and collateral—only
account for 10 percent of the variation. This result implies that for listed non-financial firms the
leverage is remarkably stable over time.
For financial firms and banks, we are only aware of the study by Gropp and Heider (2009)
which applies the insights of the non-financial firm-level literature to banks. In theory, bank
capital is determined by regulatory capital requirements and hence there should not be any cross-
sectional variation in banks leverage ratios (although there can be time variation for a given bank)
which partly explains why the empirical literature on bank leverage is sparse. Gropp and Heider
(2009) show that there is large variation in banks capital ratios and investigate whether capital
requirements are a first-order determinant of banks’ capital structure. They undertake an analysis
similar to that of Rajan and Zingales (1995) but using data that has both cross-bank and temporal
variation from BANKSCOPE as does the present article. They focus on the top 100 large listed
European and U.S. banks between 1991 and 2004. As in the U.S. non-financial firm-level study of
Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2006), they find that the importance of determinants such as size,
profitability and tangibility disappears once bank-fixed effects are accounted for. They also find
that minimum capital requirements does not have a role in explaining banks’ capital structure. This
might be because banks optimize their capital structure like firms in a market based system based
on prices and pressures from shareholders and debtors as modeled by Flannery (1994), Flannery
and Sorescu (1996), Myers and Rajan (1998), Diamond and Rajan (2000), Flannery and Rangan
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(2008) and Allen et al. (2009). Another important finding from the study of Gropp and Heider
(2009) is that on the margin banks finance their balance sheet growth entirely from non-deposit
liabilities.
As a result, the main conclusion of the empirical literature on the determinants of non-financial
firms’ and banks’ leverage so far is that patterns are pretty stable over time and determined by
similar cross-bank and cross-firm determinants in different countries, though there exist significant
country differences. The empirical results of Adrian and Shin (2008, 2009) and Greenlaw, Hatzius,
Kashyap, and Shin (2008) regarding the procylical nature of leverage suggest that the largest
banks manage their capital structures based on internal value at risk and not based on regulatory
constraints.
The recent theoretical literature on endogenous leverage builds upon financial frictions theories.
Financial intermediaries face frictions in raising funds and when these frictions worsen they sell their
assets at fire-sale prices and reduce liquidity provision. These models go back to the influential
work of Shleifer and Vishny (1992). These leverage-constraint models, for example Geanakoplos
and Fostel (2008), Adrian and Shin (2010), and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), focus on the
amount of debt financing of intermediaries which face a leverage constraint. In such models, the
asset demand (and the demand for risky assets) of the intermediary will be affected and tighter
constraints will lead to deleveraging. The next section details a simple representation of such a
setup.
3 Leverage of Investment Banks: The Adrian-Shin Model
This section outlines the framework of Adrian and Shin (2010) for understanding changes in asset
valuations and leverage. Suppose a household buys a house worth 100 dollars and finances this
investment by taking a mortgage of 90 dollars. The difference between these two sums is household’s
equity, which here equals 10 dollars. In balance sheet diagram form:
Assets Liabilities
House, 100 Equity, 10
Mortgage, 90
Leverage is defined as the inverse of the equity ratio; that is, the ratio of total assets to equity,
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hence in this example leverage is 10. Now, what happens to leverage when asset values fluctuate?









If the market value of debt stays constant asset price changes increase equity one-to-one and
leverage is inversely related to assets. When the price of a household’s house goes up, net worth
increases, and the households leverage goes down.3 For example, if the price of the house goes up
to 101 dollars, equity goes up by one dollar and leverage falls to 9.18, simply shown as:
Assets Liabilities
House, 101 Equity, 11
Mortgage, 90
Thus the prediction of a standard theory, where leverage is not actively managed, is a negative
relation between balance sheet (asset) growth and leverage growth. Given asset growth, equity
reacts and leverage adjusts.
Financial intermediaries, such as banks, can behave very differently by engaging in active bal-
ance sheet management. For example, if the intermediary targets a constant leverage it will react to
changes in net worth by adjusting debt. If balance sheets are not marked to market—as is typically
in the case for commercial banks—then leverage is measured as total book assets to book equity and
financial intermediaries can react to an increase in asset prices by increasing their debt in order to
maintain a constant leverage in terms market value. In this case, the relationship between balance
sheet leverage growth and the balance sheet size (asset growth) can be positive. This implies that
leverage can be procylical: high during booms and low during busts.4
Why might this be the case? Financial intermediaries strive to maintain a constant (maximal)
risk exposure while maximizing earnings through high leverage. A commonly used concept is VaR
(Value at Risk) which is an estimate of a financial institution’s worst case loss.5 Let us denote
3This pattern is borne out in the flow of funds data for the household sector as shown by Adrian and Shin (2010).
4This pattern is borne out in the flow of funds data for the financial sector, specifically broker-dealers, as shown
by Adrian and Shin (2010).
5VaR is usually defined with respect to a confidence level of, say, 99%. Then VaR would be defined such that the
probability that losses on the asset portfolio exceed the value VaR is less than 1%.
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Value at Risk per dollar of assets held by a bank by V . If the banks wants to maintain the total








If this sketch provides a good approximation to the behavior of (investment) banks procylical
leverage is directly related to countercylical VaR. Leverage is high during boom times since during
these times, risks are low. Leverage is low during contractions since risks are high due to increased
volatility of asset prices.
Let us go back to our previous example but now illustrate the balance sheet of a bank with the
same diagram:
Assets Liabilities
Securities, 100 Equity, 10
Debt, 90
Let us assume this bank actively manages its balance sheet to keep the leverage level constant
at 10. If the price of securities increase by 1% to 101, leverage falls to 9.18 and if the bank targets
a constant leverage of 10, it must increase its debt; i.e.,
A/E = (101 +D)/11 = 10
Thus, an increase in price of securities of 1 dollar brings an additional debt of 9 dollars. Leverage
is now 10 and the new balance sheet looks like:
Assets Liabilities
Securities, 110 Equity, 11
Debt, 99
This type of active balance sheet management makes the demand for assets procylical and
amplifies the financial cycle. When the demand for assets is high, this puts pressure on their price
which in turn increases prices and induces banks to take on more debt, increasing the size of the
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balance sheet. The mechanism works reverse in downturns, through the selling off of assets, possibly
at fire-sale prices.
This type of behavior goes against the standard theory where assets come first and equity and
debt adjust. Here, equity becomes sticky and assets grow by taking on more debt, and debt goes
down by selling of assets. This way of thinking is different from the traditional interpretation where
adjustment works via equity. According to this VaR model, leverage is explained by risk. Below
we provide evidence that indeed growth of assets and growth of leverage is positively linked for
investment banks and large banks, and that time dynamics in our leverage measures for these banks
in the U.S. follows the VIX volatility index.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
4.1 Data
We use a unique data set composed of firm- and bank-level observations from the ORBIS database
provided by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvD), between 2000–2009. This database is
an umbrella product that covers the other well-known databases from the same company such as
AMADEUS (only Europe firms), ZEPHYR (worldwide mergers), BANKSCOPE (worldwide banks)
and OSIRIS (worldwide listed firms). The time coverage of each firm/bank is a subset of the sample
period, leading to an unbalanced panel.6
The database comes in two modules: Financials, which provides financial information—both
balance-sheet and off-balance sheet items—and Ownership/Corporate tree, which provides informa-
tion on foreign and domestic owners of each firm and all the subsidiaries and many establishments.
In our original data set, we have 60,000 publicly quoted companies worldwide (OSIRIS), 30,000+
banks (BANKSCOPE) worldwide, 29 million European companies from 46 countries (AMADEUS),
18+ million U.S. and Canadian companies, 5+ million South and Central American companies, 6+
million companies in the Far East and Central Asia (mainly in Japan, Korea, China), and 790,000
African and Middle Eastern companies (ORBIS).
We will only use banks/financial firms and large non-financial firms in this study since the small
non-financial firms have no role in this crisis. In fact, we document that even large non-financial
firms were not important for the crisis and the whole action in pre-crisis leverage patterns comes
from banks and financial firms. Nevertheless, we investigate non-financial firms because Welch
6We use ZEPHYR data to control for all firm mergers and acquisitions that happened during our sample.
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(2007) show that only 10 out of the most leveraged 30 firms in S&P 500 typically are financial
firms. Table 1 shows the number of bank-year and firm-year observations used.
For banks and financial firms we use a benchmark world sample, whereas for non-financial
firms we only focus on Europe and the United States. The reasons for this focus for non-financial
firms is twofold: First, this crisis was mainly about the financial sector. Second, for banks we have
representative universal coverage and we want to compare dynamic patterns in bank leverage before
and after the crisis across developed countries and emerging markets with different regulatory and
institutional structures. However, for non-financial firms we do not have a representative sample and
the coverage across countries varies widely. We focus on “large” firms (defined as firms with more
than 150 employees) from the countries with best quality data and coverage and these countries are
European countries and the United States which have better reporting requirements for accounting
data. In Europe and the United States all large firms (listed or not) have to file with official
registries. Given this requirement our European coverage is very good but the U.S. coverage suffers
from the fact that many firms in the United States do not report assets given that most of them
only provide consolidated statements.7
We use two types of samples for both banks and firms: permanent and non-permanent. The
non-permanent sample is used in the regression analysis and in the investigation of cross-sectional
patterns. We made sure the non-permanent sample does not suffer from survivorship bias by
assembling our panel data from individual cross-sections using historical, archived releases of the
database. This is important since the BvD erases the banks in BANKSCOPE from all previous
years if the bank does not exist anymore in the current year. They apply a similar practice to firms
in AMADEUS and in ORBIS where they keep a firm for 5 years after it disappears and then erase
it from all years. Hence, the data has to be downloaded disk by disk for every year and not from
the latest disk for all the previous years.
The permanent sample is used for time series figures. We have to use a permanent sample
here otherwise we would not know if the changes we see in the dynamic leverage patterns are due
to entry and exit of banks and firms. The trade-off is that these permanent samples will suffer
from survivorship bias. Permanent samples are defined as firms and banks being there throughout
the period of 2000–2009 and have non-missing asset data—a similar choice was made by Lemmon,
Roberts, and Zender (2006).
7In addition to this issue, the BvD has a relatively thin coverage for the United States before 2007 even for
consolidated accounts.
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In the context of leverage, our bank data from BANKSCOPE is used by Gropp and Heider
(2009). In the context of the bank competition literature, it is used by Berger, Klapper, and
Turk-Ariss (2008) and Claessens and Laeven (2004). Our firm data is used by many authors in
different contexts. Arellano and Bai (2010) use AMADEUS (European firms only) to study the
relationship between leverage and financial development for one year (2004) but do not analyze
dynamic properties of leverage. Coricelli et al. (2009) use AMADEUS data for 9 CEE countries
in the pre-crisis period of 1996–2005 to study the relation between growth and leverage. ORBIS
data, where we get the U.S. firms, is identical to the well-known Dun and Bradstreet dataset which
is extensively used in the context of the United States. For example, Black and Strahan (2002)
use this data to study entrepreneurial activity in the United States and Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Mitton (2009) and Alfaro and Charlton (2010) use it for the cross-country study of concentration
and vertical integration and vertical and horizontal FDI patterns, respectively. The firm level data
also used in two other studies involving two of the authors of this article, namely, Kalemli-Ozcan,
Sørensen and Volosovych (2010) and Fons-Rosen, Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, Volosovych, Villegas-
Sanchez (2011) who study the relationship between growth, volatility, and financial integration and
productivity spillovers, respectively.
Our bank and firm data are suitable for international comparisons because the BvD harmo-
nizes the data but also because our dynamic analysis either compares banks over time within a
single country or banks over time within many countries using bank and country-time fixed effects
which control for permanent differences between banks or countries and for global common factors.
For our purpose, it is important to undertake a dynamic analysis, rather than a cross-sectional
analysis which doesn’t allow for fixed effects, because fixed effects will absorb all country- and
time-level differences that are common to all banks and firms in a country such as differences in
accounting practices, balance sheet representation, and domestic regulatory adjustments. For ex-
ample, international financial reporting standards result in higher total asset amounts than U.S.
generally accepted accounting principles because netting conditions are stricter under international
standards.
In their cross-sectional analysis, Rajan and Zingales (1995) investigate three major differences
in accounting practices to see if these make a difference in their international comparative study of
leverage patterns in G7 countries. One of these differences stem from the fact that some countries
require the reporting of consolidated balance sheets and while other countries do not, though many
firms report consolidated balance sheets together with unconsolidated. Rajan and Zingales (1995)
show that this does not make a difference to their results. In our case, fixed effects will absorb
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these difference but nevertheless for non-investment (commercial) banks and non-financial firms
we use only unconsolidated accounts to avoid double counting and improve comparability across
different countries.8 For investment banks, we use consolidated accounts because they only report
these. Adding consolidated statements (holding companies) for commercial banks does not alter
our results.
Regulatory requirements might also apply differently to different accounts. For example, in the
United States minimum capital requirements apply both to individual banks and to consolidated
banks, whereas in other countries this may be different. Investment banks and their subsidiaries are
not subject to regulatory requirements in the United States and are regulated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission while they other countries often have different regulatory systems. Again,
any non-time varying bank-level changes will be absorbed by our fixed effects.
Another difference between countries can be due to assets and liabilities being valued at book
value (historical) or at market value (current). As long as different countries follow different prac-
tices but all banks and firms do the same then these differences will be absorbed by our fixed effects.
If different banks and different firms in different countries choose different practices that change
over time then we cannot account for this (if constant over time, bank and firm fixed effects will
control for these difference). Therefore, we stick to book value overall as reported in balance sheets
if we have the choice between the two as in the case of listed firms and banks. For private firms
and banks (which is the big fraction of our data) we have book value only.
At the country level, we use two sets of variables to proxy institutional regulatory structure.
The first set of variables are from the World Bank’s Doing Business Data Set, such as indices for
the protection of Shareholder Rights and Investor Rights (taking values between 1 and 10 where
a higher value means more protection). We use 2003-2006 values of the variables to capture the
situation before the crisis. The second set of variables are from the Bank Regulation Data Set
of Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2007). This data set comes in two survey waves, an initial one
in 2003 and a later one in 2010. We use the 2003 values of the following variables: Real Estate
Restrictiveness, which is an index that measures the extent to which banks may engage in real estate
investment, development and management. The index takes a value between 1 and 4 where a value
of 1 indicates no restriction and a value of 4 means these activities cannot be conducted. Overall
Restrictiveness is a similarly defined index for real estate insurance and securities activities, where
banks may engage in underwriting, brokering and dealing in securities, insurance and all aspects
8Assets may still be not measured right for each individual bank even we use unconsolidated accounts for each
bank given the global nature of many banks.
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of mutual fund industry. This index varies between 3 and 12 since it is the sum of three different
indices and a higher number means more restrictiveness. Required Audit indicates whether or not
there is a compulsory external audit of the bank by a certified auditor. If this takes a value of
1, it means there is a required audit, otherwise the variable takes a value of zero. Supervision
Index indicates the efficiency of supervision and takes a value of 1 if there are multiple independent
supervisors for banks and zero otherwise. Monitoring Index indicates the efficiency of monitoring
and takes a value of 1 if top ten banks in the country are all rated by International Rating Agencies,
if off-balance sheet items are disclosed to public, if banks must disclose risk management procedures
to the public and if subordinated debt is required as part of regulatory capital. This index is zero
otherwise.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
For most of this article the leverage ratio is measured as the ratio of assets to equity (shareholder
funds). This measure is equivalent to the measure 1−equity/assets as used by Gropp and Heider
(2009).9 We use this measure as our benchmark measure both for non-financial firms and banks.
We also use for robustness the ratio of tier 1 capital (sum of capital and reserves minus intangible
assets) to adjusted assets, ratio of total liabilities to total assets, ratio of total debt to total assets
and ratio of total debt to equity. (Not reported in the present version of the article.) All these
measures give similar results so we focus on the assets to equity ratio as leverage measure.
The leverage ratio (assets/equity) does not include off-balance sheet exposure. One of the
key characteristic of this crisis is that, in the pre-crisis period banks funded a growing amount of
long-term assets with short-term liabilities through the use of off-balance sheet vehicles, exposing
themselves to credit and liquidity risk by providing credit facilities and guarantees to these vehi-
cles. Many have argued that this was the main amplification mechanism (see Brunnermeier, 2009
and Adrian and Shin, 2009). In addition, banks held structured credit instruments on their own
balance sheet, increasing their maturity mismatch of the balance sheet and their funding liquidity
risk. Therefore, we also investigate patterns in the ratio of off-balance sheet items (guarantees and
committed credit lines) to assets since a loan guarantee involves a future contingent commitment
even it does not show up on the balance sheet. Banks report these data together with balance
sheet as a separate memo line called off-balance sheet items where they report guarantees, com-
9Gropp and Heider use this measure because it includes all debt and non-debt liabilities of banks such as deposits
while other standard measures of leverage are less suitable for banks.
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mitted credit lines, and other exposure to securitization. Only very few banks report the last item.
Investment banks do not report any of these items.
In our regressions, we use explanatory variables that are standard in the corporate finance
literature such as size (proxied by log assets), profitability (proxied by net income/assets), and
tangibility (proxied by total earnings assets/assets). We further investigate the role of foreign
ownership, especially because the previous literature has overlooked potential effects of foreign
ownership on leverage. We divide countries into different groups and compare listed versus non-
listed firms/banks, big versus small firms/banks, and investment banks versus commercial banks.
As mentioned above, Table 1 shows the number of bank-year and firm-year observations by
country, where for firms we focus only on large firms from European countries and from the United
States to have more comparable samples. Large firms are firms with assets above 28 million USD
and more than 150 employees. We have over 1.5 million observations for these firms. We have over
200,000 bank observations from 60+ countries. Table 2 presents the number of observations by
bank type and account type. Most of our banks report unconsolidated accounts, commercial, and
not listed. Similar picture emerges from firm level data where most of our firms are non-financial.
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics, averages across bank and time. The leverage ratio can
be as high as 46 with a mean of 12 and the maximum amount of off-balance sheet items is 65
percent of assets with a mean of 10 percent. Table 3 also shows descriptive statistics by type of
bank. Investment banks have slightly higher leverage, on average. “Sponsor” banks and large
commercial banks have the highest leverage on average, around 22 and 17 respectively. “Sponsor
banks” refer to banks which have created off-balance sheet investment vehicles. These are mostly
large commercial banks. The names of the sponsor banks are from Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez
(2010). There are 70 conduit sponsor banks in their data set and we have located 62 of these in our
data. 31 of these banks are European, 23 are American, 4 are Australian, 3 are Japanese, and 1
bank is Canadian. Only 3 out of 62 are investment banks. Non-sponsor banks statistics are similar
to the statistics of all banks.
5 Empirical Patterns
5.1 Aggregate Picture
In order to interpret our results for leverage, we start by plotting the development of bank assets
and equity since 2000. In the Flow of Funds compiled by the U.S. Federal Reserve System, assets
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of commercial banks, savings institutions, and credit unions increase from about 6 trillions dollars
to over 12 trillion dollars in 2008 followed by a decline of several hundred billion since 2008—see
Panel A. Investment banks (“brokers and dealers” in the Flow of Funds) saw a tremendous growth in
assets from 2000 to 2008 followed by a steep reversal of over half a trillion dollars. Investment banks
held large amounts of assets tied to sub-prime loans. These travails of the U.S. investment banking
sector and the culmination in the default of Lehman Brothers, has been extensively documented
in many places (see for example Duffie (2010) and Krishnamurthy (2001) and other papers in the
Journal of Economic Perspective’s symposium on the financial crisis in the Winter 2010 issue).
Panel B of Figure 1 displays U.S. aggregated assets from the our bank-level data. “Aggregated,”
when results are based on bank by bank data, simply means the sum of assets (or equity) over all
the banks in the sample. Compared to the Flow of Funds data, our aggregated data overstates
assets because banks’ claims on each other are not netted out and may display slightly lower
growth as our data are deflated by the Consumer Price Index while the Flow of Funds data are
nominal. Nonetheless, the patterns in our aggregated data are similar to the patterns in the Flow
of Funds data for both investment banks and non-investment banks. Using our data, we are able to
break down the patterns for large banks, large banks excluding investment banks and small banks.
Panel C shows aggregated assets of European banks from our data.10 Assets grew marginally from
2000 till 2004 followed by a sharp acceleration to more than 20 trillion dollars in 2008 followed by
an astounding drop of about 3 trillion dollars from 2008 to 2009.
Figure 2 displays U.S. Flow of Funds equity and aggregated equity from our micro data in
Panels A and B, respectively. U.S. investment bank equity grew sharply from 2004 to 2006 followed
by a sharp drop in 2008 (the exact timing being slightly different between the quarterly Flow of
Funds data and the annual aggregated data and a sharper decline in aggregated data given the
log scale). For large banks (excluding investment banks) there has been a steady increase. For
European banks aggregated equity, see Figure 2 Panel C, increased rapidly from about 600 billion
dollars in 2004 to about 800 billion in 2007 followed by a slight drop in 2008 and a steep recovery
in 2009.
Figure 3 compares aggregate U.S. leverage, calculated as assets over equity, from the Flow of
Funds to aggregated leverage (aggregated assets divided by aggregated equity) compiled from our
micro data. The U.S. patterns from the Flow of Funds accounts in Panel A are very similar to those
of the aggregated data in Panel B which display aggregated assets divided by aggregated equity.
10European sample includes all European countries. Results with banks only from the EU are similar.
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In 2004, SEC deregulated the minimum capital requirements for investment banks, freeing leverage
ratios from regulatory constraints. A run-up in leverage of investment banks (“brokers and dealers”
in the Flow of Funds) from 2004 to 2008 is evident in both panels although the Flow of Funds data,
being quarterly, exhibits sharper peaks and valleys. The collapse in leverage of investment banks
after 2008 is also clearly evident in both panels. This is (mechanically) explained by the sharp
decline in assets combined with equity rebounding in 2009. Leverage ratio of commercial banks
was quite stable from 2000 until 2008 when a steep decline occurred. This is explained by the small
decline in assets and the steeper increase in equity seen in the previous figures. In the light of the
VaR model we discussed above, it is not surprising that the pattern in leverage is similar to the
pattern in the VIX risk measure, as shown in Appendix Figure.
Figure 4 “zooms in” on non-investment banks whose lines seemed flat due to the scale of
Figure 3 and compares to European data. The Flow of Funds leverage ratio for non-investment
banks can now be seen clearly to be quite stable between 12 and 14 until the middle of 2008
when the leverage ratio started dropping till near 9 in late 2009. A similar pattern is revealed in
Panel B using aggregated data and it appears that this decline in leverage was concentrated in
the group of large banks.11 Large banks grew faster from 2004 to 2008 but because small banks
kept growing after 2008 the difference in assets and hence the leverage ratio is now smaller. For
Europe, aggregated leverage was quite stable apart from a slight decline after the 2001 dot-com
crises until a steep run-up from 2006 to 2008 followed by a sharp fall-back in 2009—clearly caused
by the decline in assets observed in Figure 1. In Europe we do not observe a separate category of
investment banks since banking is universal.
The sub-prime crisis first came to the surface on July 31, 2007 with the default of two Bear
Stearn hedge funds followed by BNP Paribas halting withdrawals from three investment funds.
A large number of banks had created off-balance sheet conduits which mainly invested in asset-
backed securities in order to reduce capital requirements. However, most conduits were still fully or
partially guaranteed by their sponsoring banks which also provided committed lines of credit (see,
Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez (2010) for more details on this). We have measures of guarantees
and committed credit lines and we display the aggregated amounts relative to assets for all banks
and separately for large banks in Figure 5. Investment banks do not report these items. The total
amount of guarantees and credit lines were almost as large as total assets from 2000 till 2007—more
precisely 85 percent—for large banks and lower at 70 percent for all banks. From 2007 till 2009
11These figures include investment banks for large and all banks to be able to compare the magnitudes to European
banks.
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there was a sharp reversal with the aggregate amount dropping to less than 50 percent of assets
when banks were getting out these commitments in the wake of the interbank lending freeze. Large
banks and smaller banks witnessed a narrowing gap. Panel B shows similar patterns for Europe
in terms of timing, though less pronounced in scale; guarantees and committed credit lines are
only as high as 20 percent of assets. This might be also due the differences in regulation where
banks in Spain do not issue guarantees to off-balance sheet entities. The reason for this is the fact
that before the crisis only one country, Spain, had imposed similar capital charges for assets on- or
off-balance sheet and therefore Spanish banks did not sponsor conduits.
This article does not focus on guarantees and credit lines but it is obvious that banks carry
a large amount of risk that is not visible from conventional leverage ratios. Ex post, major U.S.
banks were subject to increasing risk from guaranteeing enormous pools of assets of declining
quality; however, the pattern of Figure 5 does not indicate increased risk taking before 2007—
only the collapse after the start of the crises reveals the risk taken. We will return to this theme
again during our regression analysis but it is already clear that outside of investment banks neither
leverage nor guarantees and committed credit lines relative to assets (or equity) signalled excessive
risk taking over time in the run-up to the crisis. It appears that the increasing risk exposure of
commercial banks in 2004–2007 were hidden in the deteriorating quality of the asset pool.
5.2 Median Leverage: Typical Bank and Firm
Aggregated (and Flow of Funds) patterns may be driven by a few megabanks, such as Bank of
America, Citibank, and JP Morgan. Our micro data allows us to examine leverage of typical
banks. We plot median leverage for banks over time in Figure 6. Panel A is visually dominated
by investment banks which have pro-cyclical leverage ratios between 14 and 20. These medians
are higher than those of commercial banks but much lower than the aggregate leverage ratios of
investment banks—clearly, high leverage of investment banks is concentrated within the largest
ones.
Panel B drops investment banks to better study the leverage ratio of the typical U.S. commercial
bank. For the typical large bank, leverage has been steadily decreasing from around 12 to around
10.5 with temporary increases in 2004–2005 and 2008, while the median (overall) bank has had a
stable leverage ratio between 10 and 10.5 from 2000 to 2009.12 Panel C shows that the median
European bank decreased leverage steadily from around 17.5 to 15 over our sample. The higher
12Bank leverage is much higher than typical firm leverage, displayed below, as found by Gropp and Heider (2009).
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leverage in Europe may be due to various institutional features as studied by Rajan and Zingales
(1995) who found higher leverage for European than for U.S. firms. In this paper, the focus is
on temporal patterns in leverage and we notice that typical (median) banks have falling leverage
ratios in both Europe and the United States with both countries displaying a temporary increase
in 2008.
Figure 7 shows median levels of guarantees and committed credit lines to assets for large and for
all banks. The median is much smaller than the aggregate ratio for large banks and much smaller
again for all banks. This holds for both the United States and Europe implying that issuing of
guarantees and committed credit lines was concentrated within the group of the largest banks. The
patterns so far suggests that large banks were substantially more exposed to systemic risk than
smaller banks.
5.3 Bank Leverage: Procylical or Countercyclical?
An increase in asset values will mechanically increase the value of both the numerator and denom-
inator of the leverage ratio but the increase in equity will be proportionally larger and the leverage
ratio will mechanically fall. Such a pattern is observed for households as pointed out by Adrian
and Shin (2008, 2009). However, a firm or a bank may be able to use the increased equity as basis
for further lending which will increase assets (and liabilities) relative to equity with the outcome
that asset appreciation and leverage is no longer inversely related. Adrian and Shin (2008, 2009)
demonstrate that non-financial corporations’ asset growth and leverage is virtually uncorrelated
using aggregate data from the U.S. Flow of Funds accounts.
A non-financial firm may face decreasing marginal profitability of investments; however, banks
will often be able to invest in large liquid markets, such as mortgage-backed securities with non-
decreasing marginal returns, while lending at a constant low rate through repurchase arrangements,
commercial paper, or implicitly through cash management for hedge funds. If banks have target
leverage ratios the net result will be that leverage does not increase with asset values but rather
aggregate leverage and asset growth will be positively correlated over time. Adrian and Shin (2008,
2009) show this procylicality for U.S. investment banks 1963–2006. They show that for commercial
banks the patterns is acylical, though Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap, and Shin (2008) found a similar
procylical pattern for 5 big commercial banks in the United States.
Figure 8 examines potential pro-cyclicality for U.S. investment banks, large commercial banks,
and small commercial banks in Panels A, B, and C, respectively. The figure complements Adrian
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and Shin (2008, 2009) and Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap, and Shin (2008), plotting average growth
of leverage against average growth of assets for the sample of all (investment, large, small) banks
in our dataset. In these figures, all banks have equal weight and the interpretation is that the
figures show whether banks typically display the Adrian-Shin pattern.13 Because all banks have
equal weights the patterns are not strongly affected by a few giant banks.
Panel A focusses on U.S. investment banks and the “Adrian-Shin pattern” is easily visible over
the full sample period. Year 2008 is an outlier with large declines in assets and leverage but it
pretty much lies on the line that one can easily fit using ordinary myopic eyeballs.14 For large U.S.
(non-investment) banks in Panel B, a similar pattern is visible, maybe with an even steeper slope
although the observations for 2008 and 2009, which are above the other points, probably should
be interpreted with caution: many observers, see for example, Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap, and
Shin (2008), interpret the increase in bank lending in 2008 as “forced lending” where borrowers—in
particular—were drawing on pre-committed credit lines placed in the off-balance sheet vehicles.
Certainly, the steep decline in assets, committed credit lines and guarantees that started in 2008
and accelerated in 2009 is consistent with banks needing time to unwind their obligations. Panel C
shows a clear absence of pro-cyclical leverage for smaller banks.
For European banks, in Figure 9, we observe a slight tendency for leverage to be pro-cyclical for
large banks, although with a much smaller slope than found for large U.S. banks. Smaller European
banks display a surprisingly stable level of asset growth and no hint of pro-cyclical leverage is visible
for this group of banks.
5.4 Non-Financial Firms
Mean values of leverage for large non-financial firms over time are plotted in Figure 10. Mean firm
leverage for listed U.S. firms is very stable at around 2.3-2.4 while the leverage ratio is slightly larger
for non-listed firms but still much lower than what we found for banks. This pattern is consistent
with firms hoarding cash in 2009 (for example, Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach 2004 discuss how
constrained firms may be more likely to conserve cash in a recession drawing on their bank lines
of credit). For Europe, we see slightly higher leverage ratios, which may be due to differences in
13This is different from saying that the typical bank (usually interpreted as the median) displays the pattern. In
the time series graphs, we plotted medians against time but it is not as meaningful to plot median leverage growth
against median asset growth because the medians will belong to different banks.
14Note that in Adrian-Shin figures the 2008 point is on the top of the graph since they only use first quarter of
2008 where the crisis was still in its infancy. Our annual data reflects end of year accounts.
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accounting rules, but the temporal patterns are similar to those of the United States with very
little variation over time except that we find a weak but steady decline in leverage for all (mainly
non-listed) firms. The great recession does not register at all for European non-financial firms.
Figure 11 examines potential pro-cyclicality of the leverage of non-financial firms. The U.S. data
in Panel A show no inkling of pro-cyclicality and very little systematic growth. Leverage increased
in 2008, likely due to loss of equity, but decreased as rapidly in 2009. European non-financial firms
keep a constant amount of leverage over the sample, apart from the 2008 outlier which is similar
to the United States.
5.5 Regression Analysis
From the previous section, it appears that leverage at the bank and firm level did not signal an
impending recession. In the first version of this paper we performed regressions for non-financial
firm leverage and confirmed the standard determinants of leverage, as identified in the corporate
finance literature (reviewed above), but because nothing new came to the surface we turn to bank-
level regressions in Table 4.
We estimate the relation
Leverageit = µi + α ∗ sizeit + γ ∗ profitit + δ ∗ collatit + ΣtβtDt ∗Xc(i) ,
where the left-hand side is firm level leverage, µi is a firm level dummy (“fixed effect”), Dt is
a set of time dummies (with 2000 left out to avoid collinearity), and Xc(i) is one of the institu-
tional/regulatory variables (we try several) for country c in which bank i is located.15 We control for
size (log assets), profitability, and collateral because these were found by Gropp and Heider (2009)
to be predictors of bank leverage and excluding these variables might result in left-out variable
bias.
The interpretation of the results out of this specification will be as follows: because the bank-
level dummy captures any constant bank-level (and therefore also country-level) variables the inter-
pretation of the other regressors is that they capture the change in leverage relative to bank-level
averages while they are uninformative about permanent differences between banks (and countries).
The objects of interest is the βt coefficients which show whether countries with particular regulatory
environments experience different temporal patterns in leverage.
15In the regression, we use the alternative equivalent leverage measure 1-equity/assets. The sign and significance of
the estimated coefficients are similar to what we would find with assest/equity but the measure used here is between
0 and 1 which allows for easier interpretation of the coefficients.
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The results of Table 4 are interesting. In columns (1)-(3), we run the exact regressions in
Gropp and Heider (2009) and confirm their findings that size has a positive impact on leverage
(with t-values around 40!), collateral have a positive significant impact (t-values around 10), while
profitability has a negative impact (with t-values around 10).16 These are the variables typically
found to be significant with similar signs for non-financial firms and Gropp and Heider found that
banks are not different.17 Column (2) focuses on the banks that are large and listed on stock
exchange (similar sample as Gropp and Heider) and column (3) uses lagged values, as it is typical
in the literature, and obtains a weaker fit. Lagged assets may not be relevant during the crisis
due to rapid changes in asset values and hence in the rest of the columns we use current values of
controls—-assets and leverage are obviously determined simultaneously, but the focus here is on
comparison across countries.
The temporal patterns are revealing: In columns (4) to (10) the time-dummy interaction terms
are in general not significant for 2001 to 2007 (meaning these years are similar to 2000) except for
the “required audit variable” and “monitoring variable” for which 2000 (left-out) leverage is higher
than 2001–2007 (in the countries where these variables are higher, meaning stricter regulation).
More interesting is the highly significant very robust pattern that more restrictive regulation is
associated with a relatively higher leverage in 2008. We interpret this in the light of of the time
series patterns observed in the figures. Banks with high leverage and, in particular, highly risky
assets displayed strongly declining leverage in 2008 when assets were written down. As discussed
previously, standard leverage measures did not flag that the assets on many banks’ balance sheets
were questionable, this only became apparent in assets value losses in 2008—the moment of truth! If
a restrictive regulatory environment helped banks stay on the straight and narrow path in terms of
asset quality, this should therefore also be visible only in 2008 and so it is. The positive coefficient
associated with strict regulation imply that countries with strict regulation suffered lower asset
losses which we interpret to mean that banks in those countries on average held higher quality assets
and/or avoided risk exposure through guarantees to off-balance sheet entities with questionable
assets. The coefficient to, say, overall restrictiveness of 0.003 implies that a change of 10 in overall
restrictiveness (moving from least to most restrictive) leads to a change in the leverage ratio of
0.03. If the initial leverage ratio was 0.9 and the new leverage ratio is 0.93 that implies a change
in assets over equity from 9 to 13.3 (=0.93/0.07)—a rather substantial increase in leverage. The
implications is that leverage (or more precisely the underlying problems in asset quality) and,
16We experimented with different definitions of these variables and other controls, but the results are very robust.
17Gropp and Heider find that their results are not robust to inclusion of bank-fixed effects but we find very high
significance even if such fixed effects are included here. This might be due to our bigger sample.
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therefore, the vulnerability of the real economy is significantly impacted by regulatory constraint.
Table 5 considers the relation of assets and equity separately to the restrictiveness variable.
We see that assets and equity increased more (or, in 2008, declined less) in the tighter regulation
countries relative to other countries. These results are consistent with the result in Table 4 that
tighter regulation countries deleveraged less, a result we interpret as these countries’ banks holding
less risky assets.
Figure 12 illustrates the results of Table 4 and Table 5 visually by plotting the growth of
aggregate leverage from 2007–2008 against overall restrictiveness of regulation in 2003. While
this does not exactly correspond to the regressions (since other variables are not controlled for)
it illustrates the positive slope is driven by emerging markets such as Mexico, Brazil, and Turkey,
which had stricter regulation and less declines in assets and leverage relative to developed countries
(the bottom corner of the figure) such as the U.K. and Ireland in 2008. The United States, Germany
and France are outliers.
6 Robustness and Other Issues
6.1 Other Determinants of Leverage: Banks and Firms
We have performed extensive robustness analysis, where we do not report all for space considera-
tions. We have data on the ownership structure of the banks. Calculating “foreign ownership” of
the banks as ln(1 +FO) where FO represents percent voting stakes owned by foreigners, we obtain
similar results. Foreign ownership itself enters negative and significantly. We have also used risk
weighted assets based on Basel II requirements instead of total assets obtaining similar results.
What about the role of cash holdings? Figures 13 and 14 display median and aggregate cash
holdings of European and U.S. banks. For Europe, the picture is one of steadily increasing cash
holdings, roughly mirroring the increase in assets. For the United States, the picture is similar
before the crisis although cash holdings increased a little slower than aggregate assets. However;
overall, these data would not have signalled an increase in risk taking before the crisis. The U.S. data
displays a highly pronounced spike in 2009. This reflects the breakdown of interbank lending during
the crisis when banks did not lend to other banks which might be in danger of failure. The banks,
therefore, held the assets on their books, wherefore the spike in cash, and the Federal Reserve lent
directly to banks needing short-term financing. In order to limit any potential inflationary impact
of the large reserves the Federal Reserve, for the first time in its history, began paying interest on
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reserves in October 2008. In effect, the Federal Reserve acts as an intermediary between banks
with excess funds and banks wishing to lend. This mechanism is explained in detail in Keister and
McAndrews (2009).
We have also performed firm level regressions for non-financial firms. The standard determinants
of leverage such as size, collateral and profitability all have the expected signs but there was no
visible increase or decrease in leverage of the non-financial firms before and/or after the crisis
as we have shown before graphically. We have checked whether this can be explained by firms
cash holdings but those holdings also do not show an significant time variation. These results are
available upon request.
6.2 The Role of Conduits
Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2010) show that commercial banks set up conduits to securitize
assets—specifically Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP)—without transferring risk to outside
investors. These conduits were designed to avoid capital charges and commercial banks facing more
stringent capital requirements were more likely to set up conduits with guarantees implying that
risk was not transferred outside of the banking system.
Conduits are independent shell companies sponsored by large financial institutions. Acharya,
Schnabl, and Suarez (2010) use a hand-collected dataset on the universe of conduits from January
2001 to December 2008 and their sponsors. They show that almost all conduits have credit guaran-
tees by large financial institutions. We do not have their conduit data nor we do have some of these
conduits in our data but we do have the sponsors. The data on guarantees and committed credit
lines we have shown before include the credit guarantees to conduits because these are explicit
commitments of the sponsor banks. Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2010) report that investors in
conduits only lost 1.7 percent of their investments in ABCP since the guarantees were called and
the assets were liquidated and/or absorbed by the sponsoring bank. Figure 5 is consistent with
this fact. Thus, it is clear that the deleveraging process is closely linked to these conduits and their
sponsor banks.
Did banks with conduits have different leverage? Very few of the conduit sponsor banks are
investment banks (3 out of 62 sponsors in our data) and almost all the sponsor banks are large
commercial banks. We do not have the actual conduits in our dataset but, in order to investigate
if sponsor banks had different leverage on their balance sheets, we plot Figures 1–7 dropping all
conduit sponsor banks from our permanent sample. All these figures are identical to our previous
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figures and hence not reported to save space. They are available upon request.
6.3 The Role of Mergers and Government
During the crisis, a lot of mergers took place such as Bank of America’s takeover of Merrill Lynch
as of January 2009, JP Morgan’s takeover of Bear Stearns in 2008. We do not control for these
which took place mid to end of 2008/beginning of 2009. It is most likely the case that the merger
will not cause an immediate increase in the assets of the commercial bank. But over time as the
securities held by the acquired banks are transferred, we should see a slow rise in the assets of the
commercial bank. Thus, this is an important issue if we want to trace changes in leverage and
assets throughout the end of 2010 since Bank of America’s and JP Morgan’s assets might increase
as a result of the acquisitions. The same issue might also effect the acquired banks but He, Khang,
and Krishnamurthy (2010) notes that they do not observe any change in Merrill Lynch’s asset
holdings in the first quarter of 2009. Other investment banks were not acquired but ceased to be
investment banks and converted into bank holding companies, in particular Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley. As noted by He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) even after being converted
into holding company status, the commercial banking operations represent a very small fraction of
the business of these investment banks.
He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) argue that there has been a shift in the distribution of
risky assets during 2008-2009, where the assets sold by the investment banks are bought out by
commercial banks and the government. They use aggregate flow of funds data and their results are
likely driven by big banks, which they also confirm by using data on the largest banks from SEC
filings and call reports.
The government played a very active role in recapitalizing banks. He, Khang, and Krishna-
murthy (2010) suggest that the preferred stock owned by the government must be subtracted from
equity in calculating “true leverage.” They find, using FDIC-data, that such a correction raises
the leverage of the top 19 commercial banks in the United States from 10.0 to 14.4 in the first
quarter of 2009. There is also the the issue of recording the assets at book value. He, Khang,
and Krishnamurthy (2010) argue that “true leverage” may have been as high as 30 if assets were
marked to market. While He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) were able to roughly impute the
fall in the value of banks’ asset during the peak of the crises for the commercial banking sector as a
whole and for some major banks, it is not an easy task to do systematically bank-by-bank over our
sample and hence we do not perform such an exercise. We also do not perform an adjustment on
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the government owned stock since we argue that if the purpose of measuring leverage is to gauge the
riskiness of banks, surely government owned preferred equity helps buffer the risk. We report asset
and equity holdings and leverage of big investment and commercial banks from the United States
and Europe in Table 6. Our numbers match He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) for investment
banks. For commercial banks, we have a slight increase in 2008 but not as high as found by He,
Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) since we do not adjust for government owned equity.
One final difference is that He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) focus on subsidiaries and,
most likely unconsolidated statements, since they drop holding companies. (One has to use either
consolidated or the non-consolidated statements in order to avoid double counting.) In our em-
pirical analysis we also use unconsolidated accounts for non-investment (commercial) banks and
for investment banks we use consolidated accounts throughout because these banks only report
consolidated statements. For the purpose of Table 6, we use consolidated statements and holding
companies for both commercial and investment banks in order to make a meaningful comparison
between the two groups.
7 Conclusion
Traditional leverage ratios and off-balance sheet exposure relative to assets did not signal increas-
ing risk taking by banks before the financial crises, with the exception of investment banks who
aggressively increased leverage. On the whole, increasing risk before the crisis was associated with
risky pools of assets although only few realized this at the time. When the crisis broke in 2008,
the banks with large exposure to sub-prime assets suffered large declines in assets. Larger banks
were the most exposed and it appears that the larger the banks the more risky on average. There
was little relation between leverage and restrictiveness of regulation across countries before 2008
but the countries with stricter bank regulation and stronger protection of investor and shareholder
rights were less affected by the crises implying that regulation may well have benefits even if these
benefits are invisible until the economy faces a major stress event.
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Booth L., Aivazian V., Demirgüç-Kunt A. and Maksimovic V. (2001), “Capital Structures in
Developing Countries,” Journal of Finance 56, 87–130.
Brunnermeier, M. (2009), “Deciphering the 2007/8 Liquidity and Credit Crunch,” Journal of
Economic Perspectives 23, 77-100.
Brinnermeier, M. and Pedersen, L. (2009), “Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity,” Review of
Financial Studies 22, 6, 2201–2238.
Claessens S. and Laeven L. (2004), “What Drives Bank Competition? Some International Evi-
dence,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 36, 563–583.
Coricelli, F., Driffield, N., Pal, S., and Roland, I. (2009), “Excess leverage and productivity growth
in emerging economies: Is there a threshold effect?” CEPR WP No. 7617.
Diamond, D. and Rajan, R. (2000), “A Theory of Bank Capital,” Journal of Finance 55, 2431–
2465.
Duffie, Darrell (2010) “The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks,” Journal of Economic Perspectives
24, 51–72.
Farhi E. and Tirole J. (2010), “Bubbly Liquidity,” NBER WP No. 16750.
Flannery, M. (1994), “Debt maturity and the deadweight cost of leverage: Optimally financing
banking firms,” American Economic Review 84, 320–331.
Flannery M. and Sorescu M. (1996), “Evidence of Bank Market Discipline in Subordinated Deben-
ture Yields: 1983–1991,” Journal of Finance 51, 1347–1377.
Flannery M., Rangan K. (2008) “What caused the bank capital build-up of the 1990s?” Review
of Finance 12, 391–429.
Fons-Rosen, C., Kalemli-Ozcan, S., Sørensen, B., Villegas-Sanchez, C., Volosovych, V. (2011)
“Productivity versus Competition Effects of Foreign Investment Within and Across Coun-
tries,” University of Houston, Working Paper.
26
Fostel A. and Geanakoplos J. (2008), “Leverage Cycles and the Anxious Economy,” American
Economic Review 98, 1211–1244.
Frank, M. and Goyal, V. (2004), “Capital structure decisions: Which factors are reliably impor-
tant?” Financial Management, forthcoming.
Greenlaw D., Hatzius J., Kashyap A., Shin H. (2008) “Leveraged Losses: Lessons from the Mort-
gage Market Meltdown,” U.S. Monetary Policy Forum Report No. 2.
Gropp R. and Heider F. (2009), “The Determinants of Bank Capital Structure,” European Central
Bank WP, No. 1096.
He, Z. and Khang, I., and Krishnamurthy, A. (2010) “Balance Sheet Adjustment during the 2008
Crisis” IMF Economic Review 58, 1, 118–156.
Kalemli-Ozcan, Sebnem, Sørensen, Bent E., Vadym Volosovych, Vadym, (2010) “Deep Financial
Integration and Volatility,” CEPR Discussion Paper No. 7784.
Keister, T., and McAndrews, J. (2009), “Why Are Banks Holding So Many Excess Reserves?”
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Reports no. 380.
Kiyotaki, N., and Moore J. (1997), “Credit Cycles,” Journal of Political Economy 105, 211–248.
Krishnamurthy, Arvind (2010) “How Debt Markets Have Malfunctioned in the Crisis,” Journal of
Economic Perspectives 24, 3-28.
Lemmon, M.L., M.R. Roberts, and Zender J.F. (2008), “Back to the beginning: Persistence and
the Cross-Section of Corporate Capital Structure,” Journal of Finance 63, 1575–1608.
Myers, S. and Rajan, R. (1998), “The paradox of liquidity,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 113,
733–771.
Modigliani F., Miller M. (1958) “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of
Investment,” American Economic Review 48, 261–297.
Rajan R., Zingales L. (1995), “What do we know about capital structure? Some evidence from
international data,” Journal of Finance 50, 1421–1460.
Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. (1992) “Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equi-
librium Approach,” Journal of Finance 47, 4, 1343–1366.
27





The micro-level data that we utilize in this paper provides not only the financial information on
both balance-sheet and off-balance sheet items, but also the information on foreign and domestic
owners of each firm/bank.
For banks, we have 3 sets of samples that give those information. They are created for U.S.
banks, European banks and all banks, respectively. Each sample has two sets of sub-samples;
permanent and non-permanent. The non-permanent samples are used in regression analysis and in
the investigation of cross-sectional patterns. The permanent samples are used for time-series plots.
For firms, we have 2 sets of samples that contain very large and large industrial (both financial
and nonfinancial) firms operating in U.S. and European countries. Similar to bank-level data, each
sample has two sets of sub-samples, permanent and non-permanent.
A.2 Sample Selection Criteria
As we mentioned above, we have different samples for banks and firms. The structure of those
samples differs in some aspects. Thus, different sample selection criteria are applied in each sample.
The details on the structure of samples and the corresponding sample selection criteria are given
in the below.
A.2.1 Bank Selection Criteria
The time period covered in bank-level samples that we downloaded via BANKSCOPE database is
1990-2010. However we exclude the first 6 years and the last year because of poor coverage. We
apply the following sample selection criteria to obtain the samples that we use in our regression
analysis:
• We drop central banks.
• We drop banks with faulty records such as inconsistent information on any generic variables
such as date of establishment/type of company/template etc.
• We drop bank-year observations with negative values of assets/capital/reserves or deposits.
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The final samples we obtained for U.S. and European banks have 13,964 banks with 194,802 ob-
servations and 14680 banks with 202,357 observations between 1996-2009, respectively.
In addition to above criteria, we first drop the banks that do not report Total Assets continuously
between 2000-2009 and inactive banks to obtain the final samples that we use for creating time-
series plots in this paper. The sample of European banks has 1123 banks with 11,230 observations
while the sample of U.S. banks has 7334 banks with 73,340 observations—both for the period
2000-2009.
The time period covered in the world sample that contain the banks from all countries in the
world is 1985-2009. However, we exclude the years before 1996 because of poor coverage. We apply
the following sample selection criteria to this sample that we use in our regression analysis:
• We drop countries with less than 20 banks.
• We drop central banks.
• We drop banks with faulty records such as inconsistent information on any generic variables
such as date of establishment/type of company/template etc.
• We drop bank-year observations with negative values of assets/capital/reserves or deposits.
The final sample has 32,158 banks with 229,610 observations between 1996-2009.
In addition to above criteria, we drop the banks that do not report Total Assets continuously
between 2000-2008 to obtain the permanent sample. We exclude 2009 from that permanent sample
because of poor coverage. Thus, very final sample has 9437 banks with 85,383 observations.
A.2.2 Firm Selection Criteria
The time period covered in firm-level samples that we downloaded via ORBIS and AMADEUS
databases is 1996-2010, however we exclude the last year because of poor coverage. At the very
first stage, we apply the following selection criteria and the resulting sample for U.S. firms consists
of 236,734 firms with 585,632 observations and that for European firms have 343,819 firms with
2,273,360 observations.
• We drop firms with faulty records, which have inconsistent information on any generic vari-
ables such as date of establishment/type of company/template etc.
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• We drop firm-year observations with negative values of all types of assets/capital/reserves
and deposits.
The following sample selection criteria are applied to obtain the final samples that we use in our
regression analysis:
• We drop firms if any of total assets, current liabilities and non-current liabilities is missing in
all years between 1996-2009.
• We drop firms if any of total assets, employment, sales, operating revenue, current liabilities
and non-current liabilities is negative.
• We drop firms whose total number of employees is lower than 10.
• We drop firms if Total Assets are less than 100,000 in PPP dollars.
• We drop firms if Sales are less than 1000 in PPP dollars.
• We drop firms if Operating Revenue are less than 1000 in PPP dollars.
• We drop firm-year observations at 0.1 and 0.99 percent of the tails of ratios employment/sales,sales/total
assets, operating revenue/total assets and shareholders funds/total assets
• In the data that covers European firms, we drop countries having firms less than 100 at least
6 years between 1996-2009.
• We drop firm-year observations at 0.1 and 0.99 percent tails of all leverage measures we
defined above.
• We drop firm-year observations at 0.1 and 0.99 percent tails for collateral variable defined as
total fixed assets/total assets.
• We drop firm-year observations at 0.1 and 0.99 percent tails for all profitability measures
defined above.
The resulting samples consist of 54,108 firms with 152,124 observations and 234,380 firms with
1,495,671 observations for U.S. firm-level sample and European firm-level sample, respectively.
Lastly, to obtain the samples that we use for creating time-series plots, we restrict the samples
to the firms that report Total Assets continuously in the period starting by 2000. Thus, the sample
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that contains European firms has 30,167 firms with 271,503 observations between 2000-2008. We
exclude 2009 because of the poor coverage. And the sample that contains U.S. firms has 3053 firms
with 18318 observations between 2004-2009. We exclude the years between 2000-2003 because of
poor coverage.
A.3 Variable Definitions
The structure of the financial statements is not the same for banks and firms. Not only the coverage,
but also the definition of the some variables differ, thus the construction of the variables of our
main interest needs a careful and detailed work. The details are given in the below sections.
A.3.1 Bank-Level Variables
The variables we use to calculate bank-level measures are total assets, shareholders’ funds, total
debt, total liabilities, off balance-sheet items, net income, earning assets and adjusted assets.
Total Assets: Total book value of intangible, tangible and other fixed assets.
Shareholder’s Funds: Book value of equity (issued share capital plus other shareholders fund)
Total Liabilities: Total book value of current and non-current liabilities.
Total Debt : Total book value of short term and long term debt.
Off-Balance Sheet Items: In financial statement of banks, the off-balance sheet volumes depend
on three summary lines of acceptances, documentary credits and guarantees.
Guarantees : Total amount guaranteed by the bank.
Acceptances: reported off-balance-sheet: Total amounts the bank “accepts” to pay, usually
under international trade finance arrangements where reported off balance sheet. These are usually
reported on balance sheet (as a liability, often matched by a corresponding asset for a claim by the
bank on the recipient of goods) under U.S. GAAP and IFRS.
Committed credit lines: Total committed and undrawn lines of credit extended by the bank.
Since the number of banks reporting acceptances is very limited, we used committed credit lines
and guarantees to calculate total book value of off-balance sheet items.
Net income: Book value of profit/loss before deduction of Minority interests if any (Profit
after taxation+ extraordinary and other profit). Following Heider and Gropp (2009), we used this
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variable to proxy profitability of banks (ratio of total assets).
Earning Assets: Total book value of stock, bonds, CD and income from rental property, again
following Gropp and Heider (2009), we used this variable to proxy collateral of banks (ratio of total
assets).
Adjusted Assets: Book value of total assets excluding goodwill and intangibles.
A.3.2 Firm-Level Variables
The variables we use to calculate firm-level measures are total assets, shareholders’ funds, total
debt, total liabilities, EBITDA, PLBT.
Total Assets: Total book value of intangible, tangible and other fixed assets.
Shareholder’s Funds: Book value of equity (issued share capital plus other shareholders fund)
Total Liabilities: Total book value of current (all current liabilities of the company such as
Loans+ Creditors+ Other current liabilities) and non-current liabilities (all long term liabilities of
the company such as Long term financial debt+other long term liabilities and provisions)
Total Debt : Total book value of short term and long term debt.
EBITDA: Total book value of Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization
PLBT : Profit (Loss) before tax: Operating profit+ financial profit.
A.4 Country-Level Data
In the analysis in which we utilize world bank data, we also use some country-level broad institu-
tion measures. They come from the ICRG, Doing Business databases and Bank Regulatory and
Supervisory data.
This first dataset provides a quantitative measure for the protection of property rights. The
measures on “Corruption” and “Law and Order” between 1996-2004 are selected for our purpose.
The second one provides a quantitative measure of regulations for starting a business, dealing with
construction permits, employing workers, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors,
paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and closing a business. The variables
that we use are “Starting Business”, “Getting Credit”, “Protecting Investors” and “Enforcing
Contracts”. They provide the related information between 2004-2009. The last one provides infor-
mation on bank regulations and supervisory practices for 107 countries. The database constitutes
33
of aggregate indexes that depend on responses to individual questions of the survey designed and
implemented by Barth, Caprio, and Levine and funded by World Bank 18. We use 2003 indices for
the variables regarding “Bank Activity Regulation”, “Mixing Banking / Commerce Regulation”,
“Competition Regulation”, “Capital Regulation”, “Official Supervisory Action”, “Official Supervi-
sory Experience and Structure”, “Private Monitoring”, “Deposit Insurance Scheme” and “Market
Structure”.
18For the details on the survey questions and data collection process, see Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2007). The
data is also available at the following website: www.worldbank.org/research/interest/intrstweb.htm.
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Table 1: Firms and Banks Across Countries, 2000–2009: Observations by Country
Country Bank-Year Firm-Year






































































Notes: Banks are defined broadly to include financial firms such as credit card companies, private equity firms, hedge
funds, broker-dealers, specialized credit institutions, etc. Firms are large non-financial firms from Europe and the
U.S.
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Table 2: Firms and Banks Across Countries, 2000–2009: Observations by Type
BANKS
World Europe U.S.
All 30056 14680 13964
Investment 975 402 138
Commercial 29081 14278 13826
Consolidated 6826 2612 3246
Unconsolidated 23201 10978 10606
Listed 3351 1164 1074










Notes: Consolidated and unconsolidated refers to the number of banks/firms with consolidated and unconsolidated
statements, respectively. Listed indicates the number of banks/firms that are listed on a stock exchange. Financial
firms are firms with Primary NACE Rev. 1.1 sector code i.e. J - Financial intermediation
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics: 2000–2009
Panel A: All Banks
N Mean Min Max
Leverage Ratio 180518 12.399 1.267 46.343
Total Assets (billion USD) 180611 5.117 0.011 102.159
Adjusted Assets (billion USD) 141674 3.919 0.011 83.943
Equity (billion USD) 180562 0.345 0.002 6.386
Off Balance Sheet 79573 0.007 0 11.577
(ratio of Total Assets)
Panel B: Investment Banks
N Mean Min Max
Leverage Ratio 4101 13.566 1.267 46.343
Total Assets (billion USD) 4103 13.269 0.011 102.159
Adjusted Assets (billion USD) 1890 15.104 0.011 83.943
Equity (billion USD) 4103 0.807 0.002 6.386
Off Balance Sheet 34 0.247 0 3.651
(ratio of Total Assets)
Panel C: Large Non-Investment Banks
N Mean Min Max
Leverage Ratio 33704 17.379 1.267 46.343
Total Assets (billion USD) 33713 17.584 0.011 102.159
Adjusted Assets (billion USD) 20837 16.009 0.011 83.943
Equity (billion USD) 33707 1.151 0.002 6.386
Off Balance Sheet 1601 0.09 0 11.577
(ratio of Total Assets)
Panel D: Sponsor Banks
N Mean Min Max
Leverage Ratio 406 22.712 1.267 46.343
Total Assets (billion USD) 406 80.119 0.114 102.159
Adjusted Assets (billion USD) 368 69.499 0.113 83.943
Equity (billion USD) 406 4.95 0.002 6.386
Off Balance Sheet 11 0.124 0 0.936
(ratio of Total Assets)
Panel E: Non- Sponsor Banks
N Mean Min Max
Leverage Ratio 180112 12.375 1.267 46.343
Total Assets (billion USD) 180205 4.948 0.011 102.159
Adjusted Assets (billion USD) 141306 3.749 0.011 83.943
Equity (billion USD) 180156 0.335 0.002 6.386
Off Balance Sheet 79562 0.006 0 11.577
(ratio of Total Assets)
Notes: Data is windsorized at 2 percent level. Bank statistics are based on broader world sample. In Panel A, the
statistics are given for all banks. In Panel B, statistics of conduit sponsor banks are displayed. The names of the
sponsor banks are from Acharya and Schnabl (2009). There are 70 conduit sponsor banks in their data set, where
we have 62 of these on our data. 31 of these banks are European, 23 are U.S., 4 are Australian, 3 are Japanese and 1
bank is Canadian. In Panel C, the same statistics are given for the sample in which sponsor banks are excluded from
the world bank sample of Panel A. Leverage Ratio is defined as the ratio of total assets to equity. Totals Assets are
composed of tangible and intangible assets. Adjusted assets excludes good will and intangibles. Equity is measured
as shareholder funds. Off Balance Sheet items are sum of guarantees and committed credit lines. We define large
bank as a bank that has more then a billion dollars worth of assets at the beginning of our sample.All non-ratio items
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Bank Leverage: 2000–2009, World Sample
Dependent Variable: Log Assets Log Equity
(1) (2)
Regulatory/Institutional (R/I) Overall Overall
Framework Restrictiveness Restrictiveness
2001× R/I Framework 0.027*** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.002)
2002× R/I Framework 0.035*** 0.017***
(0.003) (0.003)
2003× R/I Framework 0.042*** 0.017***
(0.003) (0.003)
2004× R/I Framework 0.042*** 0.014***
(0.003) (0.003)
2005× R/I Framework 0.042*** 0.014***
(0.004) (0.004)
2006× R/I Framework 0.042*** 0.014***
(0.004) (0.004)
2007× R/I Framework 0.040*** 0.014***
(0.004) (0.004)
2008× R/I Framework 0.031*** 0.019***
(0.005) (0.005)
Bank dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes




Table 6: Big Banks Leverage (in billion dollars)
(2007) (2008)
Assets Equity Leverage Assets Equity Leverage
Bank of America 1616 138.3 11.7 1648.9 160.6 10.3
Bearn Stearns 372.4 11.1 33.5 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Citigroup 2060.5 112 18.4 1758.2 130.6 13.5
Goldman Sachs 1054.7 47.2 22.4 802.3 59.9 13.4
JP Morgan 1471.4 116.9 12.6 1972.8 152.4 12.9
Lehman Brothers 650.9 21.2 30.7 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Merrill Lynch 960.8 30.1 31.9 605.5 18.1 33.4
Morgan Stanley 984.7 29.5 33.4 597.6 46.1 13
Wells Fargo 542 45.1 12 1187.9 92.8 12.8
BNP Paribas 71.4 4.8 14.9 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Barclays 2073.8 54.1 38.3 3335.7 77 43.3
Deutsche Bank 2315.9 47.3 49 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Fortis Bank 331.3 27.3 12.1 N.A. N.A. N.A.
RBS 3211.1 154.5 20.8 3051.3 76.8 39.7
UBS 1.5 0.2 6.4 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Notes: Data is windsorized at 2 percent level. Leverage Ratio is defined as the ratio of total assets to equity. Total
Assets are composed of tangible and intangible assets. Equity is measured as shareholder funds. All non-ratio items
are in real billion dollars.
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Figure 1: Financial Sector Assets
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Figure 2: Financial Sector Equity
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Figure 3: Financial Sector Leverage Ratio



















































All Banks Large Banks (no Inv.)
Investment Banks
Aggregate Leverage Ratio, U.S. Banks
43
Figure 4: Financial Sector Leverage Ratio (Excluding Investment Banks)
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Figure 5: Financial Sector Off Balance Sheet Items Ratio: Aggregated
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Figure 6: Financial Sector Leverage Ratio: Typical Bank
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Figure 7: Financial Sector Off Balance Sheet Items Ratio: Typical Bank
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Figure 8: Financial Sector Procylical Leverage Ratio: U.S.
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Figure 9: Financial Sector Procylical Leverage Ratio: Europe
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Figure 10: Non-Financial Sector Leverage Ratio
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Figure 11: Non Financial Sector Procylical Leverage Ratio
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4 5 6 7 8 9
Overall Bank Activity Restrictiveness, 2003
lev Fitted values
Notes: Growth in Aggregate Leverage Ratio is relative to other countries and other years. Overall Restrictiveness is
an index for real estate, insurance and securities activities. The index takes a high value if banks are restricted from
engaging in underwriting, brokering and dealing in securities, insurance and all aspects of the mutual fund industry.
The index varies between 3 and 12.
52
Figure 13: Cash Holdings of U.S. Banks
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Figure 14: Cash Holdings of Europe Banks
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Appendix Figure: Financial Sector Leverage and VIX
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